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89 
SEEKING JUSTICE IN THE EMPIRE STATE: COURT OF 
APPEALS BROADENS THE REACH OF LONG ARM 
JURISDICTION AND CLARIFIES THE STATUTORY 
GUIDELINES FOR APPLICATION OF CPLR SECTION 302(A)(1) 
Jay C. Carlisle* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This article will discuss developments in long-arm jurisdiction 
under CPLR section 302(a)(1)1 and analyze the recent New York 
State Court of Appeals‘s thoughtful and instructive decision in Licci 
ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL.2  Licci decided the 
question of whether a non-domiciliary‘s maintenance of a bank 
account in New York constituted a ―transaction of business‖ out of 
which the plaintiff‘s claims arose under the state‘s long-arm statute.  
The Licci plaintiffs had alleged that the defendant funded a 
terrorist organization responsible for the injuries and deaths of 
certain plaintiffs and decedents they represented.3  The Licci 
opinion did not decide if New York had jurisdiction over the 
 
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law: A.B., University of California at Los 
Angeles; J.D., University of California at Davis.  Jay C. Carlisle II is one of the founding 
professors at Pace University School of Law and has been an adjunct professor at the New 
York, Fordham, and Quinnipiac Law Schools.  He is a Commissioner for the New York State 
Law Revision Commission, an elected Life Fellow of the American Bar Foundation, and a 
Referee for the New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct.  Professor Carlisle has 
received the ALI-ABA Harrison Tweed Special Merit Award for his contributions to 
Continuing Legal Education and the Academic Excellence Award from the New York State 
Trial Lawyers Association. He wishes to thank Brian Zucco, a 3L at Albany Law School, for 
all of his assistance. 
1 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(1) (McKinney 2013).  Section 302 of the CPLR is New York‘s long-
arm statute.  2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN, HAROLD L. KORN & ARTHUR R. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL 
PRACTICE: CPLR ¶ 302.00 (David L. Ferstendig ed., 2d ed. 2013).  It allows New York State 
courts to assert jurisdiction over non-domiciliary persons and foreign corporations incapable 
of being served within New York, but who have the necessary contacts with the state that are 
listed in section 302.  Such defendants may be served in New York pursuant to CPLR 313.  
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 313 (McKinney 2013). 
2 Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 984 N.E.2d 893, 960 
N.Y.S.2d 695 (2012). 
3 Id. at 333, 984 N.E.2d at 896, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 698. 
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defendant but analyzed a certified question4 from the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit regarding whether there 
was a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction over the defendant.5 
In Licci, the Empire State‘s highest court answered the Second 
Circuit‘s question in the affirmative, expansively defining the 
―transaction of business‖ clause under CPLR section 302(a)(1)6 and 
extending the jurisdictional reach of the long-arm statute‘s ―arising 
out of‖ provision.7  The Licci opinion is a broad and pragmatic 
statutory interpretation of CPLR section 302(a)(1) by the Court of 
Appeals.  It signals the court‘s willingness to apply the state‘s long-
arm statute as its drafters intended,8 clarifies prior jurisprudential 
entanglement of statutory and constitutional issues,9 and is 
welcome news for the plaintiff‘s bar.10 
A.  Jurisdiction in New York 
A New York State court does not have jurisdiction to render a 
valid, binding judgment unless it has ―subject matter jurisdiction 
(competence to entertain a claim or claims), in personam 
jurisdiction (power over the person or property), and proper 
notice.‖11  Consideration of subject matter jurisdiction and notice 
are not included in this article.  If the defendant consents, is 
 
4 Interjurisdictional certification is the process that enables a federal court, prior to ruling 
on a matter, to ―obtain a definitive answer from a state‘s highest court on an unsettled 
question of state law.‖  Sol Wachtler, Lecture, Federalism is Alive and Well and Living in 
New York, 75 ALB. L. REV. 659, 661–62 (2012).  The certification mechanism thereby 
eliminates a federal court‘s need to speculate as to how a state court would rule in such 
situations.  See generally Judith S. Kaye & Kenneth I. Weissman, Interactive Judicial 
Federalism: Certified Questions in New York, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 373 (2000) (providing an 
in-depth treatment of the topic in New York). 
5 O‘Neill v. Asat Trust Reg. (In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001), 714 F.3d 659, 
681 n.16 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 
50, 66, 74 (2d Cir. 2012) (certifying questions to the New York Court of Appeals), certified 
questions accepted, 18 N.Y.3d 952, 967 N.E.2d 697, 944 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2012), certified 
questions answered, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 984 N.E.2d 893, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695 (2012), and vacated 
and remanded, No. 10-1306-cv, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 21189 (Oct. 18, 2013). 
6 See infra Part III.A. 
7 See infra Part III.B. 
8 See Adolph Homburger, The Reach of New York’s Long-Arm Statute: Today and 
Tomorrow, 15 BUFF. L. REV. 61, 62 (1966); see also infra Part IV.B.ii (discussing the Court of 
Appeals‘s application of the long-arm statute in Licci). 
9 See infra Part IV. 
10 See David D. Siegel, Longarm Jurisdiction: Foreign Bank’s Use of Correspondent N.Y. 
Bank for Money Transfers that Aid Foreign Terrorist Acts Can Support N.Y. Jurisdiction, 
N.Y. ST. L. DIG., Dec. 2012. 
11 Jay C. Carlisle, Recent Jurisdiction Developments in the New York Court of Appeals, 29 
PACE L. REV. 417, 418 (2009). 
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domiciled, incorporated, licensed to do business, or is doing business 
in New York, a state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over 
that defendant.12  Jurisdiction over the property includes in rem and 
quasi-in rem jurisdiction.13  These traditional grounds for in 
personam or power jurisdiction are referred to as general 
jurisdiction and were developed prior to the adoption of the CPLR.14  
They were incorporated into CPLR 301 by the New York 
legislature.15 
Specific jurisdiction is authorized by CPLR 302.16  It is a ―single 
contact‖ long-arm statute, which permits the state‘s courts to 
restrictively assert in personam jurisdiction over non-domiciliary 
individuals, corporations and other entities designated by the 
statute that are not subject to general jurisdiction.17  Jurisdiction 
under CPLR 302 is restricted by the contacts enumerated in the 
statute and the claims they are based on must arise out of those 
contacts.18  The long-arm statute does not extend as far as is 
constitutionally permissible19 and its application cannot violate the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.20 
In personam jurisdiction must be analyzed separately for each 
cause of action in the plaintiff‘s complaint and for each defendant, 
co-defendant, and third party defendant.21  New York courts 
 
12 See DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE §§ 80–82, 95, at 142–47, 176–78 (5th ed. 
2011).  
13 See id. § 101, at 185–87.  In rem jurisdiction occurs when the litigation directly involves 
property within the state such as mortgage foreclosures, liens or questions of ownership or 
status of the property.  Id. § 101, at 186.  Quasi-in-rem jurisdiction occurs when a non-
domiciliary‘s property within New York is properly and timely attached to obtain a basis, up 
to the value of the property, in a cause of action having a substantial and meaningful 
relationship with the property.  See id. § 104, at 190–94. 
14 Jay C. Carlisle, New York Civil Practice, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 343, 361–62 (1991). 
15 Id. 
16 N.Y. C.P.L.R 302 (McKinney 2013). 
17 Jay C. Carlisle, Civil Practice, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 75, 98–106 (1988). 
18 Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 339–40, 984 N.E.2d 
893, 900–01, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695, 702–03 (2012); see also Johnson v. Ward, 4 N.Y.3d 516, 520, 
829 N.E.2d 1201, 1203, 797 N.Y.S.2d 33, 35 (2005) (holding there was an insufficient nexus 
between the alleged transactions of business conducted in New York State and the plaintiff‘s 
personal injury claim from a motor vehicle accident); McGowan v. Smith, 52 N.Y.2d 268, 271, 
419 N.E.2d 321, 322, 437 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (1981) (observing that courts may exercise 
personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary under CPLR section 302(1)(a) where the cause of 
action arises from the non-domiciliary‘s transaction of business within the state). 
19 Banco Ambrosiano, S.p.A. v. Artoc Bank & Trust, Ltd., 62 N.Y.2d 65, 71, 464 N.E.2d 
432, 435, 476 N.Y.S.2d 64, 67 (1984) (―[I]n setting forth certain categories of bases for long-
arm jurisdiction, [the New York long-arm statute] does not go as far as is constitutionally 
permissible.‖). 
20 See Carlisle, supra note 17, at 101–02. 
21 Jay C. Carlisle, Second Circuit 2000-2001 Personal Jurisdiction Developments, 21 
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determine if in personam jurisdiction exists by using a three-step 
process.  First, assuming the court has competence to hear a matter, 
the court determines whether the plaintiff‘s service of process upon 
the defendant was procedurally proper.22  Second, the court 
determines whether there is a statutory basis under CPLR 301 or 
302 that renders the service of process effective.23  Third, the court 
determines whether the exercise of in personam jurisdiction 
comports with constitutional principles.24  The New York long-arm 
statute does not extend to the constitutional limits established by 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington25 and its progeny.  Thus, 
sometimes a court‘s statutory analysis under CPLR 302 may 
resemble the due process analysis under the Fourteenth 
Amendment leading to an entanglement in New York decisional 
jurisprudence.26  This entanglement appears particularly evident 
with respect to CPLR section 302(a)(1)27 and can result in a faulty 
jurisdictional analysis.28 
Federal courts sitting in diversity actions hearing claims that do 
not involve nationwide service of process must, under Erie 
principals, first apply New York State substantive law to determine 
if there is a statutory basis for in personam jurisdiction under CPLR 
 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 15, 17 (2001). 
22 See CIVIL PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS IN NEW YORK § 9:2 (Philip M. Halpern et al. eds., 
2000). 
23 Id. § 9:3–9:4. 
24 Id. § 9:1. 
25 Int‘l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).  The U.S. Supreme Court held that 
states‘ power to exercise in personam jurisdiction over non-domiciliary defendants was 
subject to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.  Thus, an out-of-state defendant must have ―certain minimum contacts with 
[the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‗traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice.‘‖  Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 
(1940)). 
26 See Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 246–47 (2d Cir. 2007) (―New York 
decisions thus, at least in their rhetoric, tend to conflate the long-arm statutory and 
constitutional analyses by focusing on the constitutional standard: whether the defendant‘s 
conduct constitutes ‗purposeful[] avail[ment]‘ ‗of the privilege of conducting activities within 
the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.‘‖ (alterations in 
original) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958))); McKee Elec. Co. v. Rauland-
Borg Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 377, 382, 229 N.E.2d 604, 607, 283 N.Y.S.2d 34, 37–38 (1967). 
27 See Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 66, 74 (2d Cir. 
2012), certified questions accepted, 18 N.Y.3d 952, 967 N.E.2d 697, 944 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2012), 
certified questions answered, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 984 N.E.2d 893, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695 (2012), and 
vacated and remanded, No. 10-1306-cv, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 21189 (Oct. 18, 2013); see also 
Chloé v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158, 169 (2d Cir. 2010) (taking note of the 
entanglement issue); Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 9 N.Y.3d 501, 508, 881 N.E.2d 830, 834–35, 
851 N.Y.S.2d 381, 385–86 (2007) (using a due process analysis as guidance in analyzing New 
York‘s long arm statute). 
28 See infra Part IV.B.i. 
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302.29  Only if statutory jurisdiction exists, must the court then 
decide if an assertion of jurisdiction is permitted under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.30 
B.  The Licci Opinions 
The Licci case was originally filed in New York State Supreme 
Court and removed to the United States District Court of the 
Southern District of New York.31  The district court dismissed 
plaintiff‘s claims, in part, on the grounds there was not a statutory 
basis for them under CPLR section 302(a)(1).32  The court held that 
defendant Lebanese Canadian Bank (―LCB‖) did not ―transact[] 
business‖ in New York State33 and that the plaintiff‘s claims did not 
arise out of the act enumerated in the long-arm statute because 
there was not an ―articulable nexus‖ or ―substantial relationship‖ 
between the claims and the alleged ―transaction of business‖ in New 
York.34  The district court stated ―[t]he injuries and death suffered 
by plaintiffs and their family members were caused by the rockets 
launched by Hizbollah, not by the banking services provided by LCB 
through its correspondent account or wire transfers with Amex 
Bank via New York.‖35  Finally, the district court ignored the circuit 
court‘s ―constitutional avoidance‖ doctrine and conducted a due 
 
29 See Fort Knox Music, Inc. v. Baptiste, 203 F.3d 193, 196 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that 
federal courts must apply the personal jurisdiction rules of the forum state); Bensusan Rest. 
Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1997) (dismissing for lack of personal jurisdiction 
where plaintiff failed to allege that the defendant committed a tortious act in New York, as 
required under the New York long-arm statute); Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763 
F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1985) (―[P]ersonal jurisdiction . . . is determined by reference to the law of 
the jurisdiction in which the court sits.‖); Arrowsmith v. United Press Int‘l, 320 F.2d 219, 223 
(2d Cir. 1963) (holding that in diversity actions jurisdiction is governed by the law of the state 
in which the court sits). 
30 E.g., A. I. Trade Fin., Inc. v. Petra Bank, 989 F.2d 76, 82–83 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that 
the court‘s exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant in a breach of contract action for 
defendant‘s failure to perform financial services in New York did not offend due process). 
31 See Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 330–31, 984 
N.E.2d 893, 894, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695, 696 (2012). 
32 Id. at 332, 984 N.E.2d at 895, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 697. 
33 Id. 
34 Licci ex rel. Licci v. Am. Express Bank Ltd., 704 F. Supp. 2d 403, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
aff’d in part sub nom. Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 672 F.3d 155 (2d 
Cir. 2012), questions certified to New York Court of Appeals, 673 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2012), 
certified questions accepted, 18 N.Y.3d 952, 967 N.E.2d 697, 944 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2012), certified 
questions answered, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 984 N.E.2d 893, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695 (2012), and vacated 
and remanded, No. 10-1306-cv, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 21189 (Oct. 18, 2013).  
35 Id. 
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process inquiry finding there was no jurisdiction over LCB.36 
Plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit which addressed solely 
the question of whether there was a statutory basis under CPLR 
section 302(a)(1) for in personam jurisdiction.37  The circuit court, 
after a thoughtful and instructive statutory analysis, concluded that 
Court of Appeals law did not appear to have addressed the 
jurisdictional questions presented in Licci and that the decisions of 
other New York courts did not assist the circuit court in predicting 
with confidence how the Court of Appeals would decide them.38  The 
circuit court concluded that important public policy choices, best left 
to New York‘s highest court, were involved and certified them to the 
Court of Appeals.39 
Part II of this article will summarize the Licci holdings of the 
district and circuit court.  Part III will analyze the Court of Appeals 
decision in Licci.  Part IV will explain the Court of Appeals‘s helpful 
clarification of the jurisprudential entanglement issue under CPLR 
section 302(a)(1) and Part V predicts how Licci will impact future 
statutory jurisdictional inquiries in New York State and federal 
courts.  
II.  SUMMARY OF THE LICCI FEDERAL OPINIONS 
A.  Licci: The United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York 
The district court‘s opinion was issued on March 31, 2010 in the 
form of a Memorandum Decision and Order by Judge George B. 
Daniels.40  The district court granted defendant American Express 
Bank Ltd.‘s (―Amex Bank‖) motion to dismiss plaintiff‘s complaint 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and defendant LCB‘s 
motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6) and Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(2).41 
 
36 Id.  Under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, if the plaintiffs premise their theory 
of in personam jurisdiction upon CPLR 302, and if the district court found the requirements 
of the long-arm statute were not satisfied, there was no need to address the question of 
whether jurisdiction would comport with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Id. at 406; see also United States v. Magassouba, 544 F.3d 387, 404 (2d Cir. 
2008) (collecting the cases discussing the constitutional avoidance doctrine). 
37 Licci, 673 F.3d at 54. 
38 See id. at 61–66. 
39 Id. at 74–75. 
40 Licci, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 404. 
41 Id. 
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1.  In Personam Jurisdiction Over LCB 
Judge Daniels explained that since no evidentiary hearing or 
discovery had been held plaintiffs need only make a prima facie 
showing that in personam jurisdiction over LCB exists.42  He noted, 
―The Court is to accept all averments of jurisdictional facts as true, 
and construe the pleadings and affidavits in plaintiffs‘ favor,‖ and 
that he ―must . . . determine whether New York state law provides a 
basis to assert personal jurisdiction over LCB, and if so, must then 
determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction would comport with 
constitutional principles of due process.‖43  Plaintiffs argued that 
LCB was subject to in personam jurisdiction under New York‘s long-
arm statute, CPLR section 302(a)(1), which required a showing that 
LCB transacted business in New York and that the plaintiffs‘ claims 
arose from the business activity.44  Judge Daniels stated, ―The mere 
maintenance of correspondent bank account with a financial 
institution in New York is not, standing alone, a sufficient basis to 
subject a foreign defendant to personal jurisdiction under [section] 
302(a)(1).‖45  He admitted that on rare occasions active use of a 
correspondent account may confer in personam jurisdiction over a 
non-domiciliary defendant but only if the use ―constitute[d] the ‗very 
root‘ of the claims against the foreign bank.‖46  Furthermore Judge 
Daniels believed the use ―of wire transfers [was] not a ‗use‘ of a 
correspondent account which alone [was] sufficient to confer 
jurisdiction over a foreign bank.‖47 
Judge Daniels also believed that ―[n]o articulable nexus or 
substantial relationship existed between LCB‘s general use of its 
correspondent account for wire transfers through New York and the 
specific terrorist activities by Hizbollah underlying plaintiffs‘ 
claims.‖48  He focused on the injuries and deaths suffered by 
 
42 Id. at 406 (citing Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 
1990); Hoffritz for Cutlery, Inc. v. Amajac, Ltd., 763 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1985)). 
43 Licci, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 406 (citing Tex. Int‘l Magnetics, Inc. v. Auriga-Aurex, Inc. (In re 
Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust Litig.), 334 F.3d 204, 206 (2d Cir. 2003), PDK Labs, Inc. v. 
Friedlander, 103 F.3d 1105, 1108 (2d Cir. 1997), and Saudi v. Marine Atlantic Ltd., 306 F. 
App‘x 653, 654 (2d Cir. 2009)). 
44 Licci, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 406. 
45 Id. at 407 (citing Tamam v. Fransabank SAL, 677 F. Supp. 2d 720, 726–27 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010); Daventree Ltd. v. Republic of Azerbaijan, 349 F. Supp. 2d 736, 762 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); 
Leema Enters., Inc. v. Willi, 575 F. Supp. 1533, 1537 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)). 
46 Licci, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 407 (quoting Correspondent Servs. Corp. v. J.V.W. Invs. Ltd., 
120 F. Supp. 2d 401, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)). 
47 Licci, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 407. 
48 Id. at 408 (citing Tamam, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 726). 
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plaintiffs and their family members as being caused by Hezbollah‘s 
rockets and not by LCB‘s banking services provided via its 
correspondent account with Amex Bank in New York.49  Judge 
Daniels reasoned, ―LCB‘s maintenance or use of its correspondent 
bank account is too attenuated from Hizbollah‘s attacks in Israel to 
assert personal jurisdiction based solely on wire transfers through 
New York.‖50  Judge Daniels, having found no statutory basis for in 
personam jurisdiction under CPLR section 302(a)(1), ignored the 
circuit court‘s constitutional avoidance doctrine and, after a due 
process inquiry, concluded an assertion of personal jurisdiction over 
LCB would not comport with constitutional principles under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.51  The court did not reach the merits of 
LCB‘s alternative arguments to dismiss under section 12(b)(6) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.52  Judge Daniels also denied 
plaintiffs‘ alternative request to conduct limited jurisdictional 
discovery pertaining to LCB‘s correspondent banking analysis with 
Amex Bank.53  The plaintiffs did not challenge this finding in their 
appeal to the Second Circuit.54 
B.  Licci: The United States District Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit 
1.  Introduction 
The circuit court‘s opinion was rendered by Judges Amalya 
Kearse, Robert Sack and Robert Katzmann.55  The court 
summarized the district court‘s holding with respect to the 
statutory construction of CPLR section 302(a)(1) and stated, 
The question of whether, and if so to what extent, personal 
jurisdiction may be established under N.Y. CPLR [section] 
302(a)(1) over foreign banks based on their use of 
correspondent banking accounts in New York remains 
 
49 Licci, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 408. 
50 Id. at 408. 
51 Id. 
52 See id. at 408, 411. 
53 Id. at 408. 
54 Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 58 n.7 (2d Cir. 2012), 
certified questions accepted, 18 N.Y.3d 952, 967 N.E.2d 697, 944 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2012), certified 
questions answered, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 984 N.E.2d 893, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695 (2012), and vacated 
and remanded, No. 10-1306-cv, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 21189 (Oct. 18, 2013). 
55 Id. at 54.  See generally Second Circuit Judges, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR SECOND CIRCUIT, 
http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/judgesmain.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2013) (providing 
biographies of the circuit court judges). 
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unsettled.  We conclude that New York law is insufficiently 
developed in this area to enable us to predict with confidence 
how the New York Court of Appeals would resolve these 
issues of New York State law presented on appeal.  We 
therefore certify to the Court of Appeals two questions 
concerning the application of the New York long-arm 
statute.56 
These questions were whether LCB had transacted business in 
New York under CPLR section 302(a)(1) and, if so, whether 
plaintiffs‘ claims arose out of the defendant‘s business transaction.57 
2.  Background 
The circuit court devoted considerably more time to the 
procedural history, background, and allegations in the plaintiffs‘ 
complaint than did the district court.58  The circuit court stressed 
that the plaintiffs alleged ―LCB had actual knowledge that 
Hizbollah was a violent terrorist organization, as reflected on 
official government lists, and that Shahid was part of Hizbollah‘s 
financial arm.‖59  The circuit court noted that ―plaintiffs allege that 
the bank, as a matter of official LCB policy, continuously supports 
and supported Hizbollah and its anti-Israel program, goals and 
activities,‖ and emphasized plaintiffs‘ allegation ―that LCB carried 
out the wire transfers in order to assist and advance Hizbollah‘s 
goal of using terrorism to destroy the State of Israel.‖60 
The circuit court explained the procedural history of the Licci 
case, referencing each of the plaintiffs‘ five claims against LCB, and 
noted plaintiffs‘ submission of ―a declaration by a former Israeli 
counter-terrorism official attesting to the fact that Shahid is a 
financial front for Hizballah.‖61  The court examined the district 
court‘s jurisdictional ruling at length, observing that the district 
 
56 Licci, 674 F.3d at 55. 
57 Id. at 74–75. 
58 Compare id. at 55 n.2, 56 n.4, 56–57, 57 n.5 (discussing in-depth the procedural history, 
background and allegations in plaintiffs‘ complaint), with Licci ex rel. Licci v. Am. Express 
Bank Ltd., 704 F. Supp. 2d 403, 404–06 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (focusing primarily on the allegations 
contained in plaintiffs‘ complaint), aff’d in part sub nom. Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese 
Canadian Bank, SAL, 672 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2012), questions certified to New York Court of 
Appeals, 673 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2012), certified questions accepted, 18 N.Y.3d 952, 967 N.E.2d 
697, 944 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2012), certified questions answered, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 984 N.E.2d 893, 
960 N.Y.S.2d 695 (2012), and vacated and remanded, No. 10-1306-cv, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 
21189 (Oct. 18, 2013). 
59 Licci, 673 F.3d at 56 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
60 Id. at 56–57 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
61 Id. at 57. 
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court had concluded that the LCB-Amex Bank wire transfer use of 
the correspondent bank account in New York was not a use 
sufficient to constitute a ―transaction of business‖ and that the 
correspondent bank account was too attenuated from Hezbollah‘s 
attacks in Israel to fulfill the ―arising out of‖ requirement under 
CPLR section 302(a)(1).62 
3.  Discussion 
The circuit court explained that since the assertion of in 
personam jurisdiction rests on CPLR 302, a statutory inquiry was 
first necessary; if jurisdiction was permissible under the long-arm 
statute, a second constitutional inquiry was necessary.63  It would 
involve the relevant constitutional restraints imposed by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.64  The court panel 
noted that since New York‘s long-arm statute is restricted and does 
not extend in all respects to the constitutional limits provided by 
International Shoe and its progeny: ―The state statutory and federal 
constitutional standards are thus not co-extensive, as they are in 
many other states.‖65  The court, speaking through Judge Sack 
opined, ―In many cases, the jurisdictional analysis [statutory 
determination of basis] under the New York long-arm statute may 
closely resemble the analysis under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.‖66  He observed that sometimes the 
statutory analysis of whether CPLR 302 provides a basis for in 
personam jurisdiction and the analysis of federal constitutional 
limitations have become entangled in the jurisprudence of New 
York case law.67  Judge Sack stated, ―This similarity of state-law 
and constitutional standards appears particularly evident with 
respect to N.Y. CPLR [section] 302(a)(1), the subdivision of the New 
York long-arm statute under which the plaintiffs in this case argue 
the court has personal jurisdiction over LCB.‖68 
 
62 Id. at 57–58. 
63 Id. at 59–60. 
64 Id. at 60. 
65 Id. at 60–61. 
66 Id. at 61 n.11 (citing Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. (citing Chloé v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158, 166, 169 (2d Cir. 
2010); Best Van Lines, Inc., 490 F.3d at 247; Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 9 N.Y.3d 501, 508, 
881 N.E.2d 830, 834–35, 851 N.Y.S.2d 381, 385–86 (2007)). 
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a.  “Transaction of Business” Requirement 
The circuit court first addressed the question of whether LCB‘s 
conduct constituted a ―transaction of business‖ under CPLR section 
302(a)(1).69  The court, relying on the Court of Appeals decision in 
Fischbarg v. Doucet70 focused on whether LCB had committed some 
act by which it purposefully availed itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities in New York.71  The court stressed that the 
―defendant need not physically enter New York State in order to 
transact business‖ but that the quality and nature of the 
defendant‘s contacts in New York are crucial.72  The court stated 
that ―[t]he mere maintenance of [a] correspondent bank account‖ 
and its use in New York are distinct factors.73 
The circuit court identified four Court of Appeals cases that 
involved similar sets of circumstances74 and analyzed each.  The 
principle case was Amigo Foods Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank-New 
York,75 which had announced a general rule that a correspondent 
bank relationship alone is not sufficient to form the basis for long-
arm jurisdiction under CPLR section 302(a)(1).76  Judge Sack 
distinguished Amigo from Licci because LCB had repeatedly used 
its New York bank account with the knowledge it was funding 
Hezbollah.77  The remaining cases, with Amigo, demonstrated to the 
circuit panel ―that the ‗transaction of business‘ prong of the test for 
jurisdiction under section 302(a)(1) may, in appropriate cases, be 
satisfied by a showing that the defendant maintained and used a 
correspondent bank account in New York.‖78  This is true, according 
to Judge Sack, ―even if no other contacts between the defendant and 
New York can be established, if the defendant‘s use of that account 
was purposeful.‖79 
 
69 Licci, 673 F.3d at 61. 
70 Fischbarg v. Doucet, 9 N.Y.3d 375, 880 N.E.2d 22, 849 N.Y.S.2d 501 (2007); see also 
Carlisle, supra note 11, at 420–25 (discussing the Fischbarg case). 
71 Licci, 673 F.3d at 61–62. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 62. 
74 See id. at 63–64. 
75 Amigo Foods Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank-N.Y., 39 N.Y.2d 391, 348 N.E.2d 581, 384 
N.Y.S.2d 124 (1976). 
76 Id. at 396, 348 N.E.2d at 584, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 127. 
77 See Licci, 673 F.3d at 65–66. 
78 Id. at 64. 
79 Id. at 66 (alteration in original). 
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b.  “Arising Out of” Requirement: 
i.  ―Articulable Nexus‖ and Substantial Relationship 
The circuit court explained, ―There is no bright-line test for 
determining whether the [articulable] ‗nexus‘ [or substantial 
relationship tests are] present in a particular case.‖80  The court 
stated, ―This inquiry is a fact-specific one, and [the point at which] 
the connection between the parties‘ activities in New York and the 
[plaintiffs‘] claim crosses the line from ‗substantially related‘ to 
‗mere coincidence‘ is not always self-evident.‖81  The circuit court 
criticized the district court‘s conclusion that there was no 
articulable nexus or substantial relationship between LCB‘s general 
use of its correspondent account and the specific terrorist activities 
underlying plaintiff‘s claim.82  The circuit court noted the district 
court did not separately evaluate the plaintiffs‘ Anti-Terrorism Act, 
Alien Tort Statute (―ATS‖), and Israeli-law claims.83  The circuit 
court reasoned these factors and questions of whether the ―arising 
out of‖ requirement under CPLR 302 should be applied narrowly or 
permissively, combined with the issue of whether a causal 
connection between the defendant‘s contacts with New York and the 
plaintiff‘s lawsuit is required, caused an ambiguity in the meaning 
of the statute which would best be answered by certifying the 
questions to New York‘s highest court.84  The two questions were: 
Certified Question No. 1 
Does a foreign bank‘s maintenance of a correspondent bank 
account at a financial institution in New York, and use of 
that account to effect ―dozens‖ of wire transfers on behalf of a 
foreign client, constitute a ―transact[ion]‖ of business in New 
York within the meaning of N.Y. CPLR [section] 302(a)(1)?85 
Certified Question No. 2 
If so, do the plaintiffs‘ claims under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 
the ATS, or for negligence or breach of statutory duty in 
violation of Israeli law, ‗aris[e] from‘ LCB‘s transaction of 
business in New York within the meaning of N.Y. CPLR 
 
80 Id. at 67. 
81 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Sole Resort, S.A. De C.V. v. Allure Resorts Mgmt., 
LLC, 450 F.3d 100, 103 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
82 Licci, 673 F.3d at 67–68.  
83 See id. at 68–75 (discussing the Anti-Terrorism Act, ATS, and Israeli-law claims with 
reference to New York‘s long-arm statute). 
84 Id. at 69–70, 74. 
85 Id. at 74 (first alteration in original). 
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[section] 302(a)(1)?86 
III.  LICCI: THE NEW YORK STATE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
On November 20, 2012, the Court of Appeals unanimously 
answered both certified questions in the affirmative.87 
A.  “Transaction of Business” Requirement 
The court, speaking through Judge Read, clarified the facts88 and 
noted that the several dozen United States, Canadian, and Israeli 
plaintiffs asserted personal jurisdiction over LCB was proper under 
CPLR section 302(a)(1).89  The court found that ―LCB did not 
operate branches or offices, or maintain employees, in the United 
States.  Its sole point of contact with the United States was a 
correspondent banking account with AmEx [Bank] in New York.‖90  
In determining whether LCB had transacted business under New 
York‘s long-arm statute, Judge Read reviewed four of the court‘s 
prior decisions.91  First, and most closely analogous to Licci, was 
Amigo Foods Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank-New York.92  In Amigo, 
one non-domiciliary defendant (Aroostock Trust Company) moved to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.93  Plaintiff had alleged that 
Aroostock and a New York bank, Irving Bank, were agents with a 
corresponding bank relationship upon which long-arm jurisdiction 
was based.94  Alternatively, plaintiff asked for depositions on the 
question of jurisdiction.95  The supreme court ordered depositions 
but a divided appellate division reversed and granted the 
jurisdictional motion to dismiss, concluding that the Irving Bank 
was not Aroostock‘s New York agent and that Aroostock had not 
transacted business in the Empire State.96  The Court of Appeals 
reversed, holding that disclosure should proceed because Amigo had 
alleged an agency relationship between the two banks.97  ―After 
 
86 Id. at 75 (first alteration in original). 
87 Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 341, 984 N.E.2d 893, 901, 
960 N.Y.S.2d 695, 703 (2012). 
88 See id. at 330–33, 984 N.E.2d at 894–96, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 696–98. 
89 Id. at 331, 984 N.E.2d at 895, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 697. 
90 Id. at 332, 984 N.E.2d at 895, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 697. 
91 See id. at 334–38, 984 N.E.2d at 897–900, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 699–702. 
92 See id. at 335, 984 N.E.2d at 896, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 698. 
93 Id. at 335, 984 N.E.2d at 898, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 700. 
94 Id. at 335–36, 984 N.E.2d at 898, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 700. 
95 Id.  
96 Id. at 336, 984 N.E.2d at 898, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 700.  
97 Id. 
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discovery was completed, Aroostock again unsuccessfully moved to 
dismiss.  The appellate division unanimously reversed.‖98  The 
Court of Appeals affirmed for the reasons specified by the Appellate 
Division99: ―In our view, disclosure has revealed nothing which 
forms the basis for long-arm jurisdiction over Aroostock in the 
present case.‖100 
The Licci court explained that after Amigo some New York State 
courts had found ―that a correspondent banking relationship 
‗standing by itself‘ is insufficient to establish long-arm jurisdiction‖ 
under the statutory requirements of CPLR 302.101  The court 
pointed out that these state decisions had been relied on by federal 
district court judges in the Second Circuit for the proposition that 
―the ‗mere maintenance‘ of a correspondent bank account in New 
York does not suffice to establish personal jurisdiction there.‖102  
The Licci court explained that under New York law Amigo stands 
for the proposition that the mere maintenance of a correspondent 
bank account may, depending on the particular facts of a case, be 
sufficient to constitute a transaction of business provided that ―the 
defendant‘s use of that account was purposeful.‖103 
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Amigo facts, unlike those 
in Licci, ―revealed . . . [that] Aroostock‘s purported use of the 
account . . . was essentially adventitious—i.e., it was not even 
Aroostock‘s doing.‖104  The court distinguished Amigo on the 
grounds of the complex nature of the interbank activity in Licci 
whose sole purpose was to facilitate the flow of money throughout 
the world.105  The court stated: 
Nonetheless, complaints alleging a foreign bank‘s repeated 
use of a correspondent account in New York on behalf of a 
client—in effect, a ―course of dealing‖—show purposeful 
 
98 Id. 
99 Amigo Foods Corp v. Marine Midland Bank-N.Y., 46 N.Y.2d 855, 857, 387 N.E.2d 226, 
226, 414 N.Y.S.2d 515, 515 (1979). 
100 Licci, 20 N.Y.3d at 337, 984 N.E.2d at 899, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 701 (quoting Amigo Foods 
Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank-N.Y., 61 A.D.2d 896, 897, 402 N.Y.S.2d 406, 408 (App. Div. 1st 
Dep‘t 1978)). 
101 Licci, 20 N.Y.3d at 337, 984 N.E.2d at 899, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 701. 
102 Id. (quoting Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 65 (2d Cir. 
2012), certified questions accepted, 18 N.Y.3d 952, 967 N.E.2d 697, 944 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2012), 
certified questions answered, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 984 N.E.2d 893, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695 (2012), and 
vacated and remanded, No. 10-1306-cv, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 21189 (Oct. 18, 2013)). 
103 Licci, 20 N.Y.3d at 338, 984 N.E.2d at 899, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 701 (quoting Licci, 673 F.3d 
at 66). 
104 Licci, 20 N.Y.3d at 338, 984 N.E.2d at 900, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 702. 
105 Id. at 338–39, 984 N.E.2d at 900, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 702. 
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availment of New York‘s dependable and transparent 
banking system, the dollar as a stable and fungible currency, 
and the predictable jurisdictional and commercial law of 
New York and the United States.106 
Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that LCB‘s contacts with 
New York had satisfied the statutory requirements of CPLR section 
302(a)(1).107  In so doing the court reminded the bench and bar that 
―purposeful availment‖ inquiries are objective and require a 
detailed examination of the particular facts in each case with a 
focus on the quality and nature of the defendants‘ contact or 
contacts with the Empire State.108  The court‘s holding represents a 
more precise definition of what constitutes a ―transaction of 
business‖ under CPLR section 302(a)(1) and provides proper 
precedent for future jurisdictional inquires by the bench and bar of 
New York.109 
B.  “Arising Out of” Requirement 
The Court of Appeals reaffirmed its interpretation of the second 
prong of CPLR section 302(a)(1)‘s statutory jurisdictional inquiry as 
mandating an ―articulable nexus‖ or ―substantial relationship‖ 
between the business transaction and the claim asserted.110  The 
court then stated, ―[w]e have consistently held that causation is not 
required, and that the inquiry under the statute is relatively 
permissive.‖111  The court explained that the ―arising from‖ prong of 
 
106 Id. at 339, 984 N.E.2d at 900, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 702 (citations omitted). 
107 Id. at 340–41, 984 N.E.2d at 901, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 703. 
108 Id. at 338, 984 N.E.2d at 899–900, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 701–02. 
109 See DAVID D. SIEGEL & PATRICK M. CONNORS, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 86, at 20–21 (5th 
ed. Supp. July 2013). 
110 Licci, 20 N.Y.3d at 339, 984 N.E.2d at 900, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 702 (quoting Kreutter v. 
McFadden Oil Corp., 71 N.Y.2d 460, 467, 522 N.E.2d 40, 43, 527 N.Y.S.2d 195, 198 (1988) and 
McGowan v. Smith, 52 N.Y.2d 268, 272, 419 N.E.2d 321, 323, 437 N.Y.S.2d 643, 645 (1981)). 
111 Licci, 20 N.Y.3d at 339, 984 N.E.2d at 900, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 702.  The court cites 
McGowan and Kreutter in support of its ―relatively permissive‖ standard, but neither citation 
contains explicit language supporting that proposition.  See id.  The McGowan court, 
speaking through Judge Dominick Gabrielli, cited, but did not discuss, Longines-Wittnauer 
Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1965).  
McGowan, 52 N.Y.2d at 272, 419 N.E.2d at 323, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 645.  The court said: 
―Essential to the maintenance of a suit against a nondomiciliary under CPLR [section] 302 
(subd [a], par 1) is the existence of some articulable nexus between the business transacted 
and the cause of action sued upon.‖  Id.  In Longines-Wittnauer, a New York plaintiff claimed 
he was injured in Connecticut while using a defective hammer manufactured in Illinois by a 
non-domiciliary corporation whose New York sales representative had sold the hammer to the 
retailer from whom the plaintiff bought it.  Longines-Wittnaur, 15 N.Y.2d at 464–65, 209 
N.E.2d at 80, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 24–25.  The court found long-arm jurisdiction under CPLR 
section 302(a)(1).  Id. at 467, 209 N.E.2d at 81–82, 261 N.Y.S.2d at 26–27 (―[T]he cause of 
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CPLR section 302(a)(1) limits the broader ―transaction of business‖ 
prong by restricting jurisdiction to claims arguably connected in a 
meaningful way to the business transacted in New York.112  If the 
claim is ―‗too attenuated‘ from the transaction, or ‗merely 
coincidental‘ with it‖ the statutory mandate of the second prong of 
CPLR section 302(a)(1) is not satisfied.113 
Then, in a new twist and without citing specific supporting 
authority, the court declared: 
CPLR [section] 302(a)(1) does not require that every element 
of the cause of action pleaded must be related to the New 
York contacts; rather, where at least one element arises from 
the New York contacts, the relationship between the 
business transaction and the claim asserted supports specific 
jurisdiction under the statute.114 
This broad statement follows the Licci court‘s view that the 
plaintiffs‘ allegations included reference to LCB‘s engagement in 
terrorist financing by using its correspondent account in New York 
to move dollars necessary to enable Hezbollah to inflict physical 
damages upon them.115  The court believed these references 
arguably violated duties owed to plaintiffs under the various 
statutes upon which the subject matter jurisdiction of plaintiffs‘ 
complaints were based.116  While the court‘s reformulation and 
extension of the ―arising out of‖ requirement is arguably fact 
specific to Licci, nonetheless it bodes well for the plaintiff‘s bar.117 
 
action asserted is clearly one ‗arising from‘ the purposeful activities engaged in by the 
appellant in this State in connection with the sale of its products in the New York market.‖); 
see also Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 339 F.2d 317, 321–22 (2d Cir. 1964) (refusing to 
find an articulable nexus between a ―transaction of business‖ in New York under CPLR 
section 302(a)(1) and the subsequent injury to plaintiffs in Nevada).  Based on precedent the 
only New York case which applies a permissive ―arising from‖ standard is the Longines-
Wittnaur court.  
112 Licci, 20 N.Y.3d at 339–40, 984 N.E.2d at 900–01, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 702–03. 
113 Id. at 340, 984 N.E.2d at 901, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 702 (citing Johnson v. Ward, 4 N.Y.3d 
516, 520, 829 N.E.2d 1201, 1203, 797 N.Y.S.2d 33, 35 (2005)). 
114 Id. at 341, 984 N.E.2d at 901, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 703.  This language is not found in any of 
the Court of Appeals‘s prior ―arising out of‖ jurisprudence.  It is an obvious extension of the 
requirement and is probably fact specific to the repeated use of the New York banking 
account by LCB. 
115 Id. at 340–41, 984 N.E.2d at 901, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 703. 
116 Id. at 340, 984 N.E.2d at 901, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 703. 
117 See Siegel, supra note 10. 
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IV.  COURT OF APPEALS CLARIFIES THE ENTANGLEMENT ISSUE IN 
CPLR SECTION 302(A)(1) 
In answering the certified questions, the Court of Appeals in Licci 
was cognizant of prior New York long-arm jurisprudence, some of 
which had entangled statutory and constitutional jurisdictional 
findings under CPLR section 302(a)(1).118  The Licci court‘s 
thoughtful clarification of the entanglement issue requires a brief 
review of New York long-arm jurisprudence. 
A.  Background 
The Court of Appeals has traditionally used a two part inquiry to 
determine if a non-domiciliary is subject to in personam jurisdiction 
under CPLR 302.119  The first step is to decide if the statutory 
requirements of the restricted long-arm statute have been 
satisfied.120  Do the defendant‘s contacts with the State fit within 
the acts enumerated in the statute‘s language?  If so, the next step 
is to decide if the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due 
process.121 
CPLR 302 is a restricted long-arm statute!  It does not extend as 
far as the constitutional limits permitted by International Shoe and 
its progeny.122  As the Second Circuit observed in its Licci opinion, 
New York State‘s statutory standards and the Fourteenth 
Amendment due process constitutional standards are not co-
 
118 See infra notes 129–39 and accompanying text for discussion of the entanglement of 
statutory and constitutional considerations pertaining to in personam jurisdictional inquiries. 
119 LaMarca v. Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., 95 N.Y.2d 210, 214, 735 N.E.2d 883, 886, 713 N.Y.S.2d 
304, 307 (2000) (―To determine whether a non-domiciliary may be sued in New York, we first 
determine whether our long-arm statute (CPLR 302) confers jurisdiction over it in light of its 
contacts with this State.  If the defendant‘s relationship with New York falls within the terms 
of CPLR 302, we determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process.‖).  
The LaMarca analysis is in the context of CPLR section 302(a)(3), but the two-step drill is 
presented more clearly than in any other Court of Appeals case.  Id.  When courts conflate the 
statutory and constitutional inquiries, the two-step drill is far less obvious and sometimes not 
at all used in the jurisdictional analysis.  See, e.g., Chloé v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 
616 F.3d 158, 163–64 (2d Cir. 2010); Penguin Group (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 609 F.3d 30, 
35 (2d Cir. 2010). 
120 LaMarca, 95 N.Y.2d at 214, 735 N.E.2d at 886, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 307; SIEGEL, NEW YORK 
PRACTICE, supra note 12, § 84, at 148–49; WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 1, ¶ 
302.00. 
121 LaMarca, 95 N.Y.2d at 214, 735 N.E.2d at 886, 713 N.Y.S.2d at 307; SIEGEL, NEW YORK 
PRACTICE, supra note 12, § 58, at 85; WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 1, ¶ 302.01. 
122  Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 60–61 (2d Cir. 2012), 
certified questions accepted, 18 N.Y.3d 952, 967 N.E.2d 697, 944 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2012), and 
certified questions answered, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 984 N.E.2d 893, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695 (2012), and 
vacated and remanded, No. 10-1306-cv, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 21189 (Oct. 18, 2013). 
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extensive, as they are in many states whose long-arm laws provide 
that jurisdiction is permitted to the full extent authorized by the 
U.S. Constitution.123  Thus, New York State jurisprudence 
analyzing the statutory and constitutional requirements has become 
somewhat entangled.124 
In most states, federal courts determining in personam 
jurisdictional issues have only to consider whether a non-
domicillary defendant has sufficient statutory contacts to satisfy the 
federal due process requirements.125  By contrast, since the New 
York long-arm statute is not compatible with the federal Due 
Process Clause, the courts must engage in two separate inquiries in 
order to find whether in personam jurisdiction exists.126  If there is 
no statutory jurisdiction under CPLR 302, a constitutional analysis 
is not necessary.127  Unfortunately, some courts in the Empire State, 
including the Court of Appeals, have inadvertently conflated the 
statutory and constitutional inquiries.128 
B.  Discussion 
1.  ―Transaction of Business‖ Clause: CPLR Section 302(a)(1) 
The purposeful availment language used by some New York State 
courts to define a ―transaction of business‖ has been adopted from 
United States Supreme Court opinions examining the federal 
constitutional limits on state powers to assert jurisdiction over non-
domiciliary defendants.129  In decisions such as Longines-Wittnauer 
Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke,130 McKee Electric Co. v. Rauland-
Borg Corp.,131 George Reiner & Co. v. Schwartz,132 and Deutsche 
 
123 Id.; see also Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 119, 122 & n.17 (collecting examples of long-arm statutes from other states that 
extend to constitutional limits). 
124 See Licci, 673 F.3d at 61 n.11. 
125 See Borchers, supra note 123, at 122 & n.17. 
126 Licci, 673 F.3d at 61. 
127 Id. 
128 See id. at 61 n.11. 
129 E.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (―[I]t is essential in each case that 
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of 
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its 
laws.‖ (citing Int‘l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945))). 
130 Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 457–58, 209 
N.E.2d 68, 75–76, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, 19 (1965) (describing the activities engaged in by appellant 
as ―assuredly adequate to meet the liberal statutory criterion‖ as well as ―any constitutional 
objection‖). 
131 McKee Elec. Co. v. Rauland-Borg Corp. 20 N.Y.2d 377, 381–82, 229 N.E.2d 604, 607, 
283 N.Y.S.2d 34, 37 (1967) (―There is no fixed standard by which to measure the minimal 
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Bank Securities, Inc. v. Montana Board of Investors,133 the Court of 
Appeals has relied on and cited federal jurisprudence involving 
Fourteenth Amendment considerations to decide if a non-
domiciliary defendant‘s contacts fit within the statutory limits of 
CPLR 302.  These decisions ―tend to conflate the long-arm statutory 
and constitutional analysis by focusing on the constitutional 
standard[s]‖ which results in a significant overlap of definitions for 
what constitutes a ―transaction of business‖ under CPLR section 
302(a)(1) with the constitutional ―minimum contacts‖ doctrine.134 
For example, in Deutsche Bank, the Court of Appeals discusses 
the statutory requirements of CPLR section 302(a)(1) and due 
process requirements simultaneously.135  While one may applaud 
the result in Deutsche Bank, the court‘s two part statutory and 
jurisdictional analysis is flawed.  Obviously there is some distance 
between the jurisdiction permitted by the Due Process Clause and 
that permitted under CPLR 302.136  This is particularly true with 
CPLR section 302(a)(1).137 
Unfortunately, many pre-Licci New York State and federal courts 
have relied too heavily on Fourteenth Amendment due process 
considerations, instead of state statutory authorities, when 
analyzing whether a non-domiciliary has transacted business in 
 
contacts required to sustain jurisdiction under the provisions of CPLR 302 (subd. [a], par. 
1).‖). 
132 George Reiner & Co. v. Schwartz, 41 N.Y.2d 648, 653, 363 N.E. 551, 554, 394 N.Y.S.2d 
844, 847 (1977) (―Here, [defendant] was physically present in New York at the time the 
contract, establishing a continuing relationship between the parties, was negotiated and 
made and, the contract, made in New York, was the transaction out of which the cause of 
action arose. . . . [T]he defendant‘s coming into New York purposefully seeking employment, 
his interview and his entering into an agreement with a New York employer which 
contemplated and resulted in a continuing relationship between them, certainly are of the 
nature and quality to be deemed sufficient to render him liable to suit here.‖). 
133 Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v. Mont. Bd. of Invs., 7 N.Y.3d 65, 71–72, 850 N.E.2d 1140, 
1142–43, 818 N.Y.S.2d 164, 166–67 (2006) (applying both New York statutory and federal due 
process analysis to bond transactions negotiated via electronic means). 
134 Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239, 247 (2d Cir. 2007). 
135 Deutsche Bank, 7 N.Y.3d at 71–72, 850 N.E.2d at 1142–43, 818 N.Y.S.2d at 166–67 (―In 
short, when the requirements of due process are met . . . a sophisticated institutional trader 
knowingly entering our state . . . to negotiate and conclude a substantial transaction is within 
the embrace of the New York long-arm statute.‖); see also Carlisle, supra note 11, at 422–23 
(describing application of the Deutsche Bank purposeful availment criteria in Fischbarg, in 
which the court determined that lack of physical presence was irrelevant in view of the 
quality and nature of the defendants‘ electronic contacts with the state). 
136 Best Van Lines, Inc., 490 F.3d at 248 (―Some distance remains between the jurisdiction 
permitted by the Due Process Clause and that granted by New York‘s long-arm statute.‖). 
137 See Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 61 n.11 (2d Cir. 
2012), certified questions accepted, 18 N.Y.3d 952, 967 N.E.2d 697, 944 N.Y.S.2d 472 (2012), 
certified questions answered, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 984 N.E.2d 893, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695 (2012), and 
vacated and remanded, No. 10-1306-cv, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 21189 (Oct. 18, 2013). 
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New York under CPLR section 302(a)(1).138  Excessive emphasis on 
the federal Due Process Clause has obstructed and distorted the 
statutory inquiry of CPLR section 302(a)(1) by New York State and 
federal courts.  This has produced a body of confusing precedent and 
has frustrated the legislative intent of the CPLR‘s drafters.139  
Increased emphasis on the proper statutory construction of CPLR 
section 302(a)(1) will result in a less restrictive application of New 
York‘s long-arm statute and will give our state‘s judiciary discretion 
to more permissively apply the statute. 
2.  The Correct Licci Analysis 
The Court of Appeals Licci decision correctly analyzes the 
statutory prerequisites of the ―transaction of business‖ clause by 
defining ―‗purposeful availment‘ [as] an objective inquiry, . . . 
requir[ing] a court to closely examine the defendant‘s contacts for 
their quality.‖140  The court‘s analysis does not rely on due process 
jurisprudence, but on statutory analysis by New York State 
courts.141  The Licci court‘s reformulation of its test for what 
constitutes a ―transaction of business‖ provides the bench and bar 
with clear guidelines and a focus on a fact-specific, ―quality of 
contact‖ standard, which contemplates an increase in jurisdictional 
discovery and fact-specific jurisdictional allegations by the party 
asserting long-arm jurisdiction. 
3.  Court of Appeals Extends Jurisdictional Reach of ―Arising Out 
of‖ Provision 
Assuming the party asserting jurisdiction has shown beyond a 
 
138 See supra notes 125–34 and accompanying text; see also Hi Fashion Wigs, Inc. v. Peter 
Hammond Adver., Inc., 32 N.Y.2d 583, 587, 300 N.E.2d 421, 423, 347 N.Y.S.2d 47, 50 (1973) 
(―[Defendant] must be deemed to have ‗purposefully‘ availed himself ‗of the privilege of 
conducting activities within [this] state,‘ thereby ‗invoking the benefits and protections of its 
laws.‘‖ (second alteration in original) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958))). 
139 See, e.g., Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. Franklyn, 26 N.Y.2d 13, 16–17, 256 N.E.2d 
506, 507–08, 308 N.Y.S.2d 337, 339–40 (1970).  In Parke-Bernet, the Court of Appeals 
engaged in a very detailed analysis of the facts of the case and how they supported a finding 
of valid long-arm jurisdiction.  See id. at 15–19, 256 N.E.2d at 507–09, 308 N.Y.S.2d at 338–
41.  Forty years later, in Fischbarg, the court presented a similar analysis with the purpose of 
applying the long-arm statute to the full extent authorized by the drafters of CPLR section 
302(a)(1).  Fischbarg v. Doucet, 9 N.Y.3d 375, 380–85, 880 N.E.2d 22, 27–30, 849 N.Y.S.2d 
501, 506–09 (2007). 
140 Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, 20 N.Y.3d 327, 338, 984 N.E.2d 893, 899–
900, 960 N.Y.S.2d 695, 701–02 (2012) (citing Fischbarg, 9 N.Y.3d at 380, 880 N.E.2d at 26, 
849 N.Y.S.2d at 505). 
141 See Licci, 20 N.Y.3d at 338–40, 984 N.E.2d at 899–901, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 701–03. 
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preponderance of the evidence that the non-domiciliary transacted 
business in New York, she has the same burden of showing her 
claim arose out of the transaction.142  This involves consideration of 
the ―articulable nexus‖ or ―substantial relationship‖ tests.143  The 
tests were created by the Court of Appeals to limit the broader 
reach of the ―transaction of business‖ clause.144  Accordingly, the 
claim must ―in some way arguably [be] connected to the 
transaction,‖ and ―[w]here this necessary relatedness is lacking, . . . 
the claim [is] ‗too attenuated‘ from the transaction.‖145  Some New 
York State and federal courts have entangled constitutional due 
process limits with their ―arising out of‖ statutory interpretation 
analysis.146  These courts have viewed the ―arising out of‖ 
requirement in restrictive terms using elements of proximate cause 
for findings of an articulable nexus or substantial relationship 
between the claim and business transaction.  The Licci Court of 
Appeals rejects this approach.147 
The Licci court stated, ―We have consistently held that causation 
is not required, and that the inquiry under the statute is relatively 
permissive.‖148  Nonetheless, the court explained its ―relatively 
permissive‖ standard in terms of a relatedness between the 
transaction and the legal claim.149  The court stated, ―But these 
standards connote, at a minimum, a relatedness between the 
transaction and the legal claim such that the latter is not 
completely unmoored from the former, regardless of the ultimate 
merits of the claim.‖150 
The Licci court‘s ―no causation‖ finding means the ―arising out of‖ 
requirement need only relate to plaintiffs‘ allegations of LCB‘s 
transfer of money from its corresponding account in New York with 
the knowledge it would be used to fund violent acts by Hezbollah 
against the plaintiffs instead of finding an articulable nexus 
between the money transfer and the injuries sustained by the 
plaintiffs.151  The court‘s distinction is crucial for a finding of 
 
142 Id. at 339–40, 984 N.E.2d at 900–01, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 702–03. 
143 Id. at 339, 984 N.E.2d at 900, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 702. 
144 See id. at 339–40, 984 N.E.2d at 900–01, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 702–03. 
145 Id. at 340, 984 N.E.2d at 901, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 703 (quoting Johnson v. Ward, 4 N.Y.3d 
516, 520, 829 N.E.2d 1201, 1203, 797 N.Y.S.2d 33, 35 (2005)). 
146 See supra notes 128–134 and accompanying text. 
147 See Licci, 20 N.Y.3d at 339, 984 N.E.2d at 900, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 702. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. (footnote omitted). 
151 Id. at 341, 984 N.E.2d at 901, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 703. 
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jurisdiction over LCB.  The Licci court went further by holding that 
because personal jurisdiction under CPLR section 302(a)(1) is 
―fundamentally about a court‘s control over the person of the 
defendant, the inquiry logically focuses on the defendant‘s 
conduct.‖152  This suggests that a fact specific pleading connecting a 
claim or claims for injuries to allegations that a defendant‘s conduct 
violated a duty to plaintiffs, will satisfy the ―arising out of‖ 
requirement. 
The Licci court further liberalized the ―arising out of‖ 
requirement by stating, 
Not all elements of the causes of action pleaded are related 
to LCB‘s use of the correspondent account.  And the specific 
harms suffered by plaintiffs flowed not from LCB‘s alleged 
support of a terrorist organization, but rather from rockets.  
Yet CPLR [section] 302(a)(1) does not require that every 
element of the cause of action pleaded must be related to the 
New York contacts; rather, where at least one element arises 
from the New York contacts, the relationship between the 
business transaction and the claim asserted supports specific 
jurisdiction under the statute.153 
Thus, even though not all of the Licci plaintiffs‘ claims related to 
LCB‘s use of the correspondent account in New York and some 
specific harm suffered by plaintiffs resulted from rockets rather 
than repeated bank transfers from New York, the plaintiffs‘ pled 
enough to satisfy the ―arising out of‖ requirement.  The court‘s 
language can be characterized as an expansive reading of the 
second prong of the CPLR section 302(a)(1) statutory inquiry.  It is 
particularly helpful to plaintiffs in tort cases, involving claims 
arising from a ―transaction of business‖ within New York, but 
involving injuries occurring outside the state‘s territorial 
boundaries.  If these claims, even in some respects, bear a close 
connection to the transaction, the ―arising out of‖ prong will be 
satisfied if the plaintiff alleges the defendant‘s negligent conduct 
has an articulable nexus to the transaction even though the injuries 
may not. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals in Licci more precisely defines CPLR section 
 
152 Id. at 340, 984 N.E.2d at 901, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 703. 
153 Id. at 341, 984 N.E.2d at 901, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 703. 
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302(a)(1)‘s ―transaction of business‖ clause in objective, fact-specific 
terms, focusing on the quality and nature of a non-domiciliaries‘ 
purposeful conduct in New York.  The court draws a clear line 
between the statutory conduct and constitutional due process 
inquires for a jurisdictional analysis which portends a more 
expansive application of the first statutory prong of CPLR section 
302(a)(1). 
The Licci court also reformulates and liberalizes the second 
―arising out of‖ statutory prong of CPLR section 302(a)(1).  The Licci 
opinion defines the ―arising out of‖ requirement as ―fundamentally 
about a court‘s control over the person of the defendant.‖154  The 
court specifically states the requirement is ―relatively permissive‖ 
and is not causally related to the results of a claim.155  Also, the 
Licci court makes it clear the ―arising out of‖ requirement does not 
demand that all elements of a claim arise out of the business 
transaction but that ―at least one element‖ does.156  This suggests 
the court‘s willingness to accept statutory inquiries under CPLR 
section 302(a)(1) that are more permissive.  The Licci court has 
signaled that the distance between statutory and constitutional 
jurisdictional inquiries has lessened and has clarified its prior 
jurisprudential entanglement of the statutory and constitutional 
analysis of CPLR section 302(a)(1).  It is likely that the state‘s long-
arm statute will be more expansively applied.  It is also likely there 
will be an increased use of jurisdictional discovery and more 
emphasis on detailed jurisdictional pleading in New York State and 
federal courts. 
Lastly, the Licci New York State Court of Appeals decided only 
that in personam jurisdiction exists over LCB under CPLR section 
302(a)(1).157  The Second Circuit still needed to conduct a due 
process inquiry under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution before it could make a final determination that LCB 
was subject to in personam jurisdiction in the federal action.  On 
October 18, 2013, the Second Circuit ruled that ―the district court‘s 
exercise of personal jurisdiction over LCB is consistent with due 
process protections.‖158  With the district court‘s jurisdictional 
 
154 Id. at 340, 984 N.E.2d at 901, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 703. 
155 Id. at 339, 984 N.E.2d at 900, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 702. 
156 Id. at 341, 984 N.E.2d at 901, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 703. 
157 See Licci, 20 N.Y.3d at 334, 339, 984 N.E.2d at 897, 900, 960 N.Y.S.2d at 699, 702. 
158 Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, No. 10-1306-cv, 2013 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 21189, at *31 (2d Cir. Oct. 18, 2013).  The court held that subjecting LCB to specific 
jurisdiction was proper because LCB‘s ―selection and repeated use of New York‘s banking 
system, as an instrument for accomplishing the alleged wrongs for which the plaintiffs seek 
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dismissal vacated and the matter remanded for further 
proceedings,159 the issue remains whether the plaintiffs will succeed 
on the merits.  The answer to that question, however, will have to 
wait until another day. 
 
redress, constitutes ‗purposeful[] avail[ment] . . . of the privilege of doing business in [New 
York].‘‖  Id. at *21 (quoting Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 305 
F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 2002)) (alterations in original).  Furthermore, the court stated that 
LCB failed to demonstrate that subjecting it to specific jurisdiction would be unreasonable 
and thereby offend ―principles of fair play and substantial justice.‖  Licci, 2013 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 21189, at *31.   See also Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, Jurisdiction Over 
Foreign Financial Institutions Based on Bank Accounts, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 29, 2013, at 3, col. 1 
(―As a result of this decision, foreign financial institutions may be subject to personal 
jurisdiction in New York based on correspondent accounts they hold in the state, even when 
their business is otherwise outside of the United States.‖).   
159 Licci, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 21189, at *33. 
